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A new formulation of the EPR argument is presented, one which uses John Bell’s mathematically
precise local causality condition in place of the looser locality assumption which was used in the
original EPR paper and on which Niels Bohr seems to have based his objection to the EPR argu-
ment. The new formulation of EPR bears a striking resemblance to Bell’s derivation of his famous
inequalities. The relation between these two arguments – in particular, the role of EPR as part one
of Bell’s two-part argument for nonlocality – is also discussed in detail.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eugene P. Wigner summed up a widely held view of
the implications of Bell’s Theorem[1] when he stated: “In
my opinion, the most convincing argument against the
theory of hidden variables was presented by J. S. Bell.
....The...argument shows that any theory of hidden vari-
ables conforming to the postulate of locality is in conflict
with quantum mechanics.”[2]
N. David Mermin echoed this view in his review article
on “Hidden Variables and the Two Theorems of John
Bell”:
“Bell’s theorem establishes that the value
assigned to an observable must depend on
the complete experimental arrangement un-
der which it is measured, even when two ar-
rangements differ only far from the region in
which the value is ascertained – a fact that
Bohm theory exemplifies, and that is now un-
derstood to be an unavoidable feature of any
hidden-variables theory.
To those for whom nonlocality is anathema,
Bell’s Theorem finally spells the death of the
hidden-variables program.”[3]
In a nutshell, this common viewpoint seems to be based
on the following apparently straightforward sort of rea-
soning: Bell proved that hidden-variables theories have to
be nonlocal (in order to agree with the empirically correct
predictions of quantum mechanics); nonlocality conflicts
with relativity’s prohibition on super-luminal causation;
relativity is true; so hidden-variables theories must be
false.
Yet somehow this argument failed to compell the dis-
coverer of the theorem in question. As Mermin concedes,
Bell himself “did not believe that either of his no-hidden-
variables theorems excluded the possibility of a deeper
level of description than quantum mechanics.” How
strange! Bell himself did not believe that what Mermin
refers to as Bell’s two “no-hidden-variables theorems,”
actually exclude hidden-variables! Why didn’t Bell ac-
cede to the interpretation of his own theorems offered by
Wigner, Mermin, and so many other learned commenta-
tors on the foundations of quantum physics? Was this
universally-recognized genius really so obtuse?
Mermin provides a clue in the continuation of the
above block-quote:
“But not for Bell. None of the no-
hidden-variables theorems persuaded him
that hidden-variables were impossible. What
Bell’s Theorem did suggest to Bell was the
need to reexamine our understanding of
Lorentz invariance...”
Thus Bell believed that his theorems brought out a con-
flict not merely between relativity and hidden-variables
theories, but, rather, between relativity and the predic-
tions of quantum theory as such, in any interpretation.
Mermin briefly mentions this possible view in a footnote:
“Many people contend that Bell’s Theorem demonstrates
nonlocality independent of a hidden-variables program,
but there is not general agreement about this.”
Evidently the “many people” referred to here by Mer-
min include in their ranks Bell himself.
Given the unique clarity and forthrightness of Bell’s
writings, it is not surprising that we needn’t undertake
extensive detective work to infer Bell’s views. He tells us
quite explicitly both that and why he believes his theo-
rems call into question our understanding of fundamental
space-time structure, and not merely the attempt to sup-
plement quantum mechanics with additional variables.
Here is the that : “...the nonlocality of quantum me-
chanics cannot be attributed to incompleteness, but is
somehow irreducible.”[1, pg 244] Also: “The obvious def-
inition of ‘local causality’ does not work in quantum me-
chanics, and this cannot be attributed to the ‘incomplete-
ness’ of that theory.” [1, pg 256] And: “For me then this
is the real problem with quantum theory: the apparently
essential conflict between any sharp formulation and fun-
damental relativity. That is to say, we have an apparent
incompatibility, at the deepest level, between the two
fundamental pillars of contemporary theory...” [1, pg
172]
And here is the why: “That ordinary quantum me-
chanics is not locally causal was pointed out by Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen, in 1935.” [1, pg 24] That is, ac-
cording to Bell, the reason Bell’s Theorem spells trouble
2(in the sense of requiring apparently-relativity-violating
nonlocality) for more than just hidden-variables theories
is that standard quantum mechanics itself (regarded as
an already-complete description of the world) is nonlocal
– a fact which Bell claims was pointed out in the famous
1935 EPR paper.
But this raises another mystery. Everyone knows that
the purpose of the EPR paper was not to argue that
quantum mechanics (QM) is nonlocal, but, rather, to ar-
gue against the completeness doctrine. Indeed, the EPR
argument was crucially premised on the very assumption
– locality – that Bell claims EPR disproved: according
to EPR, if
(A) the quantum-mechanical predictions for
certain correlations are correct
and if
(B) quantum theory is required to respect the
principle of locality
then the claim that
(C) the theory is complete
cannot be correct. Or, taking as indubitable the (exper-
imentally well-confirmed) empirical predictions of quan-
tum theory referred to in (A), the EPR argument takes
the form:
(B)→ ¬(C). (1)
That is, locality implies incompleteness. (We use the
symbol ¬ to denote negation: e.g., ¬(X) should be read
“it is not the case that (X)”.)
But this is logically equivalent to the claim that
(C)→ ¬(B) (2)
(i.e., completeness implies nonlocality) and also to the
claim
¬(B) or ¬(C). (3)
(i.e., either locality or completeness must fail). Einstein
himself stated the conclusion of the EPR argument in
this last form:
“By this way of looking at the matter, it be-
comes evident that the paradox [EPR] forces
us to relinquish one of the following two as-
sertions:
(1) the description by means of the ψ-function
is complete.
(2) the real states of spatially separated ob-
jects are independent of each other.”[4]
Evidently, then, this is the basis for Bell’s assertion
that EPR showed that “ordinary quantum mechanics is
not locally causal.” For if we grant the premise (and
it is one that has been insisted on by advocates of the
Copenhagen approach ever since the 1930’s) that QM is
complete, it follows from the EPR argument that ordi-
nary QM itself is nonlocal. So if the EPR argument is
sound – if it is correct that quantum mechanics, if com-
plete, is nonlocal – then Bell’s own interpretation of the
significance of his theorems (and not the more widely-
held interpretation put forward by Wigner and Mermin)
would be validated. For this would show that, whether or
not one wishes to supplement QM with hidden variables,
one must advocate a nonlocal theory in order to account
for the empirical data.
But is the EPR argument sound? The standard view in
the physics community has been that Niels Bohr refuted
the EPR argument in 1935 by pointing out an “essen-
tial ambiguity” in the famous EPR criterion of reality:
“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can pre-
dict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity)
the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an el-
ement of physical reality corresponding to this physical
quantity.”[5]
Bohr claimed that “the wording of the above men-
tioned criterion...contains an ambiguity as regards the
meaning of the expression ‘without in any way disturb-
ing a system’.” That is, Bohr seems to have objected to
the formulation of locality which entered into the EPR
reality criterion. In particular, he argued that there was
a type of non-mechanical disturbance which EPR had ne-
glected and that the criterion was therefore inapplicable
to the very example on which they base their argument:
“Of course there is in a case like that just considered
no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system
under investigation during the last critical stage of the
measuring procedure. But even at this stage there is es-
sentially the question of an influence on the very condi-
tions which define the possible types of predictions regard-
ing the future behavior of the system. Since these condi-
tions constitute an inherent element of the description
of any phenomenon to which the term ‘physical reality’
can be properly attached, we see that the argumenta-
tion of [EPR] does not justify their conclusion that [, if
local, the] quantum-mechanical description is essentially
incomplete.”[6]
Many commentators (including, not surprisingly, Bell)
have questioned the validity, clarity, and relevance of
Bohr’s reply. (See in particular pages 155-6 of Ref. [1]
for Bell’s lucid analysis of Bohr’s reply to EPR.) Nev-
ertheless, it is true that the exact definition of locality
used as a crucial premise in the EPR argument – and
also the exact role of that premise in the argument – are
less than crystal clear. It would be desirable, therefore,
if the condition of local causality could be clarified, and
the EPR argument reformulated in terms of this clearer
concept. This is the goal of the present paper.
Happily, there is almost no work to do to achieve
this goal – for in the course of establishing his so-called
“no-hidden-variables” theorems, John Bell introduced an
intuitive and mathematically precise definition of local
causality. So the goal at hand can be achieved simply
3by replacing EPR’s somewhat vague language about not
disturbing a distant system with the quantitative require-
ment of Bell Locality. We will perform this replacement
in Section III after first, in Section II, briefly reviewing
the original EPR argument. Finally, in Section IV, we
discuss the relation of the re-formulated EPR argument
to Bell’s Theorem – in particular, the role of the EPR
argument in Bell’s two-part argument for nonlocality.
II. THE EPR ARGUMENT
Before presenting the updated version, let us briefly re-
cap the original EPR argument. We will use the scenario
introduced by Bohm [7] in which different spin compo-
nents of two spin-1/2 particles take the place of the po-
sition and momentum variables used in the original EPR
paper. The two versions, however, are identical in terms
of logical structure, so we will refer freely to the orig-
inal EPR paper as if they had based the argument on
Bohm’s example. Our goal in this section is simply to
lay out the logical structure of the EPR argument, so
that we can provide a recognizably similar structure in
the next section (but with Bell Locality in place of EPR’s
looser locality assumption).
Consider two spin-1/2 particles which are spatially sep-
arated and in the spin singlet state:
ψ0 =
1√
2
(|+z>1 |−z>2 − |−z>1 |+z>2) (4)
where |+z >1 is the state in which particle 1 has spin
+ along the z-axis, etc. Equation 4 attributes no defi-
nite spin values to either of the two particles separately,
but it does imply a definite relation between the spins:
whatever the spin of particle 1 is (measured to be) along
the z-axis, the spin of particle 2 along the z-axis will be
(measured to be) opposite.
The same singlet state can also be written in other
bases, e.g., the basis of eigenstates for spin along the x-
axis:
ψ0 =
1√
2
(|+x>1 |−x>2 − |−x>1 |+x>2) . (5)
This rewriting makes manifest the fact that, in addition
to the perfect (anti-) correlation of (measured) spin val-
ues along the z-axis mentioned above, there is also a per-
fect (anti-) correlation of (measured) spin values along
the x-axis: if we measure the spin of particle 1 along the
x-axis and find the result +, we can be certain that the
spin of particle 2 along the x-axis (if/when measured)
will be −, and vice versa.
This perfect anti-correlation of outcomes when the
spins are measured along parallel axes is the first assump-
tion of the EPR argument. We will henceforth refer to it
as “EPR(A)”.
The EPR argument then proceeds as follows.
According to the EPR criterion of reality, “If, with-
out in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with
certainty ... the value of a physical quantity, then there
exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this
physical quantity.” Let us simply assume that, since par-
ticles 1 and 2 are spatially separated, the act of measur-
ing the spin of particle 1 along the z-axis doesn’t disturb
particle 2 in any way, and likewise for a measurement of
the spin of particle 1 along the x-axis. (This assump-
tion is obviously motivated by relativity’s prohibition on
causal relations between space-like separated events – a
relationship that the two measurement events in question
here can simply be stipulated to have.) Let us call this
locality assumption “EPR(B)”.
EPR now argue: by measuring the z-axis spin of par-
ticle 1, we can infer the z-axis spin of particle 2 by us-
ing EPR(A) – without, evidently, in any way disturbing
particle 2. There exists, therefore, an element of real-
ity corresponding to the z-axis spin of particle 2. Why?
Because after the measurement on particle 1, particle 2
is known to be in a state with a definite value of spin
along the z-axis. This follows from a trivial application
of EPR(A). But, by EPR(B), the measurement on par-
ticle 1 could not have caused particle 2 to acquire this
property, for particle 2 was not disturbed in any way by
the measurement on 1. Thus if particle 2 is known to
have this property after the measurement, it must ev-
idently have possessed it all along, independent of the
measurement made on particle 1. The measurement on 1,
if/when performed, permits us to learn something about
the z-axis spin of particle 2. But the fact we learn about
exists (i.e., is an element of reality) independent of that
measurement.
The same argument obviously goes through for the x-
axis spin as well: by measuring the x-axis spin of particle
1, we can determine without in any way disturbing par-
ticle 2, the x-axis spin of particle 2. There exists, there-
fore, an element of reality corresponding to this property
of particle 2 as well.
The reader might perhaps worry that either one or the
other of these inferences can be validly made in a given
experimental situation, but both cannot be, since we can
measure at most one of the two relevant properties of
particle 1 (and hence infer using EPR(A) only one of the
two relevant properties of particle 2). EPR answer this
possible worry in their paper:
“One could object to this conclusion on the
grounds that our criterion of reality is not suf-
ficiently restrictive. Indeed, one would not ar-
rive at our conclusion if one insisted that two
or more physical quantities can be regarded
as simultaneous elements of reality only when
they can be simultaneously measured or pre-
dicted. On this point of view, since either one
or the other, but not both simultaneously, of
the quantities ... can be predicted, they are
not simultaneously real. This makes the real-
ity of [the two properties of particle 2] depend
upon the process of measurement carried out
on [particle 1], which does not disturb the sec-
4ond [particle] in any way. No reasonable [i.e.,
local] definition of reality could be expected
to permit this.”[5]
Thus – although the operators for these two observables
don’t commute and therefore cannot according to quan-
tum mechanics possess simultaneous definite values –
the x-axis and z-axis spins of particle 2 do possess si-
multaneous definite values. There are elements of real-
ity corresponding to both quantities. And that means
the descriptive limitations imposed by QM (expressed
most pointedly by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Princi-
ple) can be beaten: there are more facts out there in
the world than can be squeezed into the quantum me-
chanical description.[16] We thus arrive at the negation
of “EPR(C)” – the claim that the quantum mechanical
description of reality can be considered complete.
The EPR argument thus takes the symbolic form:
EPR(A) and EPR(B) → ¬EPR(C) (6)
which is logically equivalent to
EPR(A) and EPR(C) → ¬EPR(B) (7)
and also to
¬EPR(A) or ¬EPR(B) or ¬EPR(C) (8)
which is Einstein’s formulation quoted above: (given the
empirically well-verified quantum mechanical expressions
for certain correlations) the advocate of orthodox quan-
tum theory is “forced to relinquish” either the locality
claim [EPR(B)] or the completeness claim [EPR(C)].
III. THE EPR-BELL ARGUMENT
Like the EPR argument just considered, the new ver-
sion of EPR (let us call it the EPR-Bell argument, since
it is modeled after the reasoning of Bell) begins with
Bohm’s example of a system consisting of two spatially
separated spin-1/2 particles in the spin-singlet state,
Equation 4.
Let us first introduce the analog of EPR(A) for
the EPR-Bell argument. We will use here a slightly-
expanded set of empirical predictions compared to the
simple perfect anti-correlation used in the original EPR
argument. But, like the assumption EPR(A) above,
these predictions will all be straightforward, uncontro-
versial predictions of QM that are well-confirmed by ex-
periment.
First, we introduce the probability for joint outcomes
(A and B) for spin measurements along arbitrary direc-
tions aˆ and bˆ on the two particles (respectively) in the
singlet state ψ0 of Equation 4:
P (A=+, B=+ | aˆ, bˆ, ψ0) = 1
2
sin2(θ/2) (9)
P (A=+, B=− | aˆ, bˆ, ψ0) = 1
2
cos2(θ/2) (10)
P (A=−, B=+ | aˆ, bˆ, ψ0) = 1
2
cos2(θ/2) (11)
P (A=−, B=− | aˆ, bˆ, ψ0) = 1
2
sin2(θ/2). (12)
where θ is the angle between aˆ and bˆ. Call this set of
assertions “EPR-Bell(A1)”.
We also note the standard quantum expressions for the
marginal probabilities for the outcomes of spin measure-
ments on each particle individually:
P (A=+ | aˆ, ψ0) = 1/2 (13)
P (A=− | aˆ, ψ0) = 1/2 (14)
P (B=+ | bˆ, ψ0) = 1/2 (15)
P (B=− | bˆ, ψ0) = 1/2. (16)
This set of expressions – which we shall refer to as “EPR-
Bell(A2)” – simply states that with the particles in the
state ψ0, we are equally likely to get a + or − outcome for
any single measurement on a single particle, independent
of the angles aˆ and bˆ.
With that set of assumptions on the table, let us pro-
ceed with the argument.
Consider now a general expression for the joint proba-
bility for the two outcomesA and B, when the spin values
along directions aˆ and bˆ, respectively, are measured:
P (A,B | aˆ, bˆ, λ). (17)
Here λ is a complete specification of the physical state of
the particle pair prior to measurement.
Let us introduce now “EPR-Bell(B)” – the requirement
of Bell Locality – according to which the joint probability
P (A,B | aˆ, bˆ, λ) should factor into a product of individual
probabilities for the two spatially separated systems, with
each factor containing conditionalization only on local
variables. (See also Bell’s lengthier and clearer discussion
of this result in the essay “La Nouvelle Cuisine” in Ref.
[1].)
P (A,B | aˆ, bˆ, λ) = P (A |B, aˆ, bˆ, λ)× P (B | aˆ, bˆ, λ)
= P (A |B, aˆ, λ)× P (B | bˆ, λ)
= P (A | aˆ, λ)× P (B | bˆ, λ). (18)
The equality in the first line is standard conditional prob-
ability, and should be completely uncontroversial. The
move from here to the second line involves an application
of what Abner Shimony has dubbed “Parameter Indepen-
dence” (PI). [9] This principle asserts that the probabili-
ties associated with particular outcomes for each particle
should be independent of which property is measured on
the distant particle – e.g., P (B|aˆ, bˆ, λ) = P (B|bˆ, λ). The
physical intuition motivating PI is that any such stochas-
tic dependence could only be accounted for by a “spooky
nonlocal action at a distance” by which the setting of
the distant instrument somehow causally influenced the
(probability distribution of) results of the nearby exper-
iment.
5Finally, the move to the third line utilizes what Shi-
mony calls “Outcome Independence” (OI), according to
which the probabilities associated with particular out-
comes for each particle should be independent of the
outcome (+ or -) of the distant experiment. Again, this
seems to be an aspect of the more general (locality) re-
quirement that what happens here should be indepen-
dent of what happens over there – or, more precisely,
that the (probability distribution for) outcomes of a given
experiment can be completely accounted for by facts in
the past light-cone of the detection event – here, by the
pre-measurement, complete, joint state of the particles:
λ.
Bell summarizes the motivation for this mathematical
statement of locality as follows:
“A theory will be said to be locally causal if
the probabilities attached to values of local
beables in a space-time region ... are unal-
tered by specification of values of local be-
ables in a space-like separated region..., when
what happens in the backward light cone of
[the first region] is already sufficiently speci-
fied, for example by a full specification of local
beables [in that backward light cone].” [1, pg
240]
Bell specifically argues for the validity of the factor-
ization of probabilities (our equation 18 above) as fol-
lows: “Invoking local causality, and the assumed com-
pleteness of ... λ ... we declare redundant certain
of the conditional variables in the last expression [our
first line above] because they are at space-like separa-
tion from the result in question.” That is, for example,
P (B|aˆ, bˆ, λ) = P (B|bˆ, λ), and so forth.
(It should also be noted that Jon Jarrett [10] was the
first to point out that Bell Locality was entailed by the
conjunction of the two principles PI and OI, though Jar-
rett referred to these principles by different names. Tim
Maudlin, however, has quite reasonably criticized Jar-
rett’s analysis of Bell’s factorization principle. [11] As
Maudlin points out, Jarrett’s parsing is not unique, so
the relevance of the distinction between PI and OI is
called into question. Moreover, Jarrett originally argued
that a failure of PI would mean a violation of relativ-
ity, while a failure of OI would not. But, as Maudlin
makes clear, this makes no sense: if relativity is taken to
prohibit causal dependency between space-like separated
events, violations of PI and OI are equally at odds with
it. The reader is urged to consult Maudlin’s text for a
much more extensive and highly enlightening discussion.)
What concerns us here, however, is not primarily
the validity of Bell’s mathematical formulation of local
causality, i.e., whether the sort of dependence prohibited
by the factorization of the joint probability is equivalent
to the sort of dependence that is supposed to be pro-
hibited by relativity. Rather, our goal is merely to show
that this condition (widely known to be required in Bell’s
demonstration that hidden variable theories respecting
the condition cannot agree with experiment) can also be
used to reformulate the EPR demonstration that the or-
thodox version of QM (in which the wave function alone
is considered a complete description of reality) must dis-
agree with experiment if it respects the locality condition.
Let us then simply name the Bell Locality condition,
Equation 18, as one of the premises – “EPR-Bell(B)” –
and proceed with that argument.
The third principle relevant to our derivation is the
completeness assumption. We have previously intro-
duced the symbol λ to refer to, in Bell’s words, “a full
specification of local beables” in the backwards light
cones of the two detection events. In typical derivations
of Bell’s theorem, this symbol refers to the wave function
and/or whatever hidden-variables are needed to complete
the (in that context, assumed incomplete) description
provided by the wave function alone. But we are not
here reproducing Bell’s theorem. We are instead aiming
to reproduce the EPR argument, so we will assume with
Bohr that quantum mechanics itself is already complete,
without the addition of any supplementary “hidden” vari-
ables. We will then demonstrate that there is a contradic-
tion implied by the four assembled principles, and hence
arrive at the EPR conclusion that either locality or com-
pleteness – or, less plausibly, one of EPR-Bell(A1) or
EPR-Bell(A2) – must fail.
Thus, let us now formally make the completeness as-
sumption – i.e., replace λ with the appropriate quan-
tum mechanical wave function, ψ0. Call this replacement
“EPR-Bell(C)”.
We may now combine EPR-Bell(B) with EPR-Bell(C).
The result is:
P (A,B | aˆ, bˆ, ψ0) = P (A | aˆ, ψ0)× P (B | bˆ, ψ0). (19)
This leaves us in a position to utilize the expressions in
EPR-Bell(A2). Plugging in yields:
P (A=+, B=+ | aˆ, bˆ, ψ0) = 1/4 (20)
and
P (A=+, B=− | aˆ, bˆ, ψ0) = 1/4 (21)
and
P (A=−, B=+ | aˆ, bˆ, ψ0) = 1/4 (22)
and
P (A=−, B=− | aˆ, bˆ, ψ0) = 1/4. (23)
These expressions have been deduced by straightfor-
wardly combining EPR-Bell(A2), (B), and (C) – i.e., the
quantum expressions for marginal probabilities, Bell Lo-
cality, and the assumption that the quantum mechani-
cal description of physical reality is complete. And, as
should be obvious, these predictions conflict with the ex-
pressions in EPR-Bell(A1). We have thus proved that all
four of these principles cannot be simultaneously correct.
At least one member of the set must be false.
6And since EPR-Bell(A1) and EPR-Bell(A2) are both
directly supported by experiment, we must evidently
reject either EPR-Bell(B) – (Bell) Locality – or EPR-
Bell(C) – completeness – on pain of contradiction. [17]
This of course matches the conclusion reached by EPR.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have shown that it is possible to reformulate the
EPR argument by using Bell’s mathematically precise lo-
cal causality requirement, and that doing so permits the
EPR argument to go through as intended by its authors.
That is, we have shown that orthodox QM (to the extent
that it is consistent with experiment and regarded as pro-
viding a complete description of physical reality) violates
Bell Locality. In some sense, this is very old news. It has
been known for some time that orthodox QM violates
the condition of Outcome Independence (OI), and that
Bell Locality is equivalent to the conjunction of OI and
PI. Yet the full implications of this do not seem to have
been widely appreciated.
Opponents of the hidden-variables program tend to
side with Bohr in dismissing the EPR argument (con-
sidered as an argument against the completeness doc-
trine), and simultaneously to regard Bell’s Theorem as a
valid proof of the non-viability of hidden-variables theo-
ries. The real point of the present paper is to demonstrate
the inconsistency of these two views, by highlighting the
similarity between the EPR argument (as reformulated
here) and Bell’s Theorem.
There seems to be no way of rejecting the argument
in Section III that does not simultaneously commit one
to rejecting the applicability of Bell’s Theorem. For ex-
ample, one might object that the factorizability condi-
tion (Equation 18) fails to capture relativity’s prohibition
on super-luminal causation. (See, for example, [12].) If
granted, this objection would indeed preclude the need to
regard orthodox quantum theory as in conflict with rel-
ativity; but it would also remove the ground from those
who use Bell’s Theorem to argue that hidden variable
theories must conflict with relativity (and are thus not
viable).
Simply put, the EPR argument (as recast in Section
III) and the well-known arguments leading to Bell’s The-
orem are are completely parallel: each shows that a cer-
tain type of theory, if required to respect the Bell Locality
condition, fails to reproduce certain empirical facts – or,
equivalently, each shows that the only way the theory in
question can maintain consistency with experiment is to
violate Bell Locality.
In the case of the (reformulated) EPR argument, the
relevant theory is the orthodox interpretation of quantum
mechanics, according to which the wave function alone is
regarded as providing a complete description of physical
reality. We may thus state the upshot of the argument
as follows: if you maintain that QM is complete (and
that its empirical predictions are correct) you are forced
to concede that the theory violates Bell Locality. Thus,
the completeness assumption entails the failure of Bell
Locality:
EPR: Completeness→ ¬Bell Locality. (24)
Bell’s Theorem, on the other hand, tells us that a cer-
tain type of local hidden variable theory cannot agree
with experiment – or, equivalently, the only way a hidden
variable theory (i.e., a theory in which the wave function
alone is regarded as an incomplete description of physi-
cal reality) can be made to agree with experiment is to
violate the Bell Locality condition:
Bell: Incompleteness→ ¬Bell Locality. (25)
Combining these two arguments forces us to conclude
(without qualification, for surely QM either is or is not
complete[18] ) that Bell Locality fails:
EPR + Bell : ¬Bell Locality. (26)
We can now see the extent to which the widely held
view described in Section I is confused and misleading.
Mermin is, strictly speaking, correct when he says: “to
those for whom nonlocality is anathema, Bell’s Theorem
finally spells the death of the hidden-variables program.”
But he seems to have forgotten that, to those same peo-
ple (for whom nonlocality is anathema), the EPR ar-
gument spells the death of the non-hidden-variables pro-
gram – i.e., the orthodox interpretation of QM which up-
holds the completeness doctrine. For orthodox QM itself
violates Bell Locality, the same locality condition that
empirically-viable hidden-variable theories must, accord-
ing to Bell’s Theorem, violate.
The choice between orthodox QM and hidden variables
theories is thus not (as is so often suggested [19]) a choice
between a local theory and a nonlocal theory; it is a
choice between two non-local theories, two theories that
violate Bell Locality. What Bell’s Theorem (combined
with the reformulated EPR argument) spells the death
of is thus the principle of Bell Locality – nothing more
and nothing less. People “for whom [such] nonlocality is
anathema” are therefore simply out of luck.
This should clarify exactly why Bell understood his
theorem not as ruling out the hidden-variables program,
but rather as evidencing a deep conflict between the pre-
dictions of quantum theory as such, in any interpreta-
tion, and the locality principle suggested by relativity.
This seems to have been misunderstood largely because
it has not been grasped that Bell’s Theorem is the sec-
ond part of a two-part argument for the conclusion.[20]
The necessary first part of that argument is nothing but
EPR, which generations of physicists have claimed was
refuted by Bohr. But, simply put, it wasn’t – as the new
formulation presented in Section III should help make
clear.
In order to stress the parallel structure of the EPR
argument and Bell’s Theorem, we have up to this point
7framed them as both arguments showing the inevitabil-
ity of nonlocality for a certain type of (empirically vi-
able) theory: EPR shows that the price of regarding QM
as complete is rendering the theory manifestly nonlocal;
Bell shows that if we regard standard QM as incomplete,
the hidden variable theory which replaces it will have to
be nonlocal. It is possible, however, to frame the same ar-
gument in a slightly different logical form, as follows: ac-
cording to EPR, if we want to insist that quantum theory
respect the Bell Locality principle (and agree with exper-
iment) we must conclude that it is incomplete (i.e., that
there exist variables which supplement the wave func-
tion description and determine experimental outcomes
in a local manner); but then, Bell’s Theorem shows that
this project cannot succeed – a theory which uses such
variables to explain the EPR correlations simply cannot
yield the correct predictions for more general correla-
tions. This means that the goal of interpreting quantum
mechanics in a way that respects the locality principle,
cannot be reached. No local theory – orthodox QM most
certainly included – can be consistent with experiment.
This is the form in which Bell himself elaborated his
complete two-part argument for nonlocality:
“Let me summarize once again the logic that
leads to the impasse. The EPRB [i.e., EPR-
Bohm – the EPR argument using Bohm’s ex-
ample] correlations are such that the result of
the experiment on one side immediately fore-
tells that on the other, whenever the analyz-
ers happen to be parallel. If we do not accept
the intervention on one side as a causal influ-
ence on the other, we seem obliged to admit
that the results on both sides are determined
in advance anyway, independently of the in-
tervention on the other side, by signals from
the source and by the local magnet setting.
[That is the EPR argument – part 1 of Bell’s
2-part argument.] But this has implications
for non-parallel settings which conflict with
those of quantum mechanics. [That is Bell’s
Theorem – part 2.] So we cannot dismiss in-
tervention on one side as a causal influence
on the other.”[1, pg 149]
It is hoped that the current paper will begin to over-
turn a truly unfortunate historical injustice – namely, the
idea (implied by the widely-held misinterpretation of the
meaning of Bell’s Theorem described in Section I) that
John Bell failed to understand his own most important
insight.
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